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Abstract 
Many theoretical models show that redistribution causes low growth. 
However, cross-country regressions often suggest that growth is posi-
tively related to redistribution. This paper analyzes that puzzle in an 
open economy framework. Among other things it is shown that tax 
competition and the danger of capital outflows leads optimizing, redis-
tributing governments to pursue high growth, no redistribution policies 
in technologically similar economies. However, if a redistributing gov-
ernment's economy is technologically superior, it is shown that it may 
attract foreign owned capital, have relatively higher GDP growth and 
may redistribute. Both results imply that in a cross-section of countries 
one would observe a positive association between growth and redistribu-
tive transfers. 
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1 Introduction 
In policy discussions and in the theoretical literature it is often argued 
that high redistributive taxes cause capital outflows and low growth. For 
instance, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and others have shown that polit-
ical objectives leading to policies favouring the non-accumulated factor 
of production (e.g. labour) imply low growth in closed economies. How-
ever, researchers are often surprised to find that redistributive transfers 
are significantly positively related to growth in cross-country growth re-
gressions. See, for instance, Perotti (1994) or Sala-i-Martin (1996). 
This paper offers an explanation of the puzzle. It is shown that 
redistributing governments which face high capital mobility or which 
attempt to stop capital outflows before tackling distributional issues 
will pursue policies that are indistinguishable from, that is, observation-
ally equivalent to high growth policies. This holds in an environment 
where foreign governments might benefit from the outflow of domestically 
owned capital and if the economies involved are technologically similar. 
If a redistributing government's economy is technologically superior, it is 
shown that it may attract foreign owned capital, have relatively higher 
growth and may redistribute resources to the non-accumulated factor 
of production. Both results imply that in a cross-section of countries 
one would observe that growth correlates positively with redistributive 
transfers. 
Suppose the government faced the redistribution-capital-outflow-
low-growth problem and that stopping capital outflows was good for 
growth. Then in a world, in which capital was - perhaps only weakly -
mobile, it might deal with the problem in two reasonable ways. First, the 
government could act sequentially. It might prefer not to tolerate capital 
outflows at all. After having secured the maximum possible size of the 
capital stock, it might then, and only if feasible, redistribute capital. 
Second, it could solve the problem simultaneously. It might strictly prefer 
to redistribute at the expense of losing some capital. In this paper the 
sequential solution method is referred to as the New Left approach (NL) 
and the simultaneous solution as the Old Left approach (01). 
come recipients. In the paper the governments adopt the source principle 
for the taxation of internationally mobile wealth. 5 Furthermore, the in-
vestors can costlessly shift their assets to the country offering the highest 
return on capital. 
For given policies the open economy market equilibrium is char-
acterized by balanced growth and the return on capital is always equal 
across countries. That is what one would expect in a highly integrated 
world where investors can costlessly shift capital. However, depending on 
the public policy the level of GDP may be very different across countries. 
If capital flight occurs, a country may loose its entire productive capital 
stock so that no GDP is generated and the workers 'starve'. These styl-
ized features of the model serve to bring out sharply the long-run effects, 
capital flight may have for an economy. 
The governments of otherwise identical economies are taken to en-
gage in tax competition.6 A right-wing government wants to maximize 
the domestic capital owners' income and does not care about the do-
mestically installed capital stock. In contrast, a left-wing government 
wants a high level and growth of GDP, because wages and redistribution 
depend positively on the overall capital stock. Therefore, the left-wing 
government does everything to prevent capital flight. It wishes to attract 
('grab') as much domestically or foreign owned capital as possible. 
For similar, that is, equally efficient economies I show that in equi-
librium there is no room for redistribution. Thus, even two left-wing 
governments do not redistribute in the optimum. The intuition for the 
result is the following: For redistribution a left-wing government has to 
set high taxes, which imply a low return to capital, inducing capital flight. 
The resulting decrease in welfare is so high that a left-wing government is 
better off if it does not redistribute. Compensation is given by stopping 
any capital relocation and securing high enough wages. 
5This may be justified by the observation that in a non-cooperative environment 
with very high capital mobility, and absent any problems arising from transfer pricing, 
governments may not be able to monitor their residents' wealth perfectly. 
6Tax competition has been studied in numerous papers such as, for instance, Gor-
don (1983), Wilson (1986), Wildasin (1988), or Sinn (1990). 
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abroad, there are more resources for redistribution and the level of GDP 
and its growth are higher when capital mobility is very high than under 
the optimal left-wing policy in a closed economy. Clearly, the capital relo-
cation effect is highest when capital mobility is perfect. For these reasons 
an efficient economy's left-wing government would want very high capital 
mobility. Furthermore, it would generally have a relatively stronger in-
terest in innovation (superior technology) than a right-wing government 
as that enlarges redistributive freedom. 
To generalize the results suppose capital mobility was not perfect. 
Then in a market equilibrium the returns to capital would not be the 
same across countries for given policy. For similar countries the tax 
competition equilibria would all be unique because of the costs to capital 
relocations or due to a NL policy, which strictly attempts to prevent 
capital outflows. Furthermore, in a technologically superior economy the 
policies would be qualitatively the same if the government was 01 and 
perfect capital mobility prevailed or was NL and capital mobility was 
imperfect. Thus, all the essential qualitative results would hold if there 
was imperfect capital mobility and the government pursued a NL policy. 
From this I conclude the following: 
A hypothetical comparison of possible matches of public policies 
implies that a right-wing policy is always growth maximizing in the 
model. An efficient economy's left-wing policy does not necessarily max-
imize growth, but it induces capital flight (outflow) for an inefficient 
economy's opponent. Thus, hypothetically distributing resources towards 
labour may be bad for notional, maximum growth. 
However, in terms of observable comparisons, either an optimizing, 
left-wing government chooses the growth maximizing tax rate in simi-
lar countries against any opponent or it has a more efficient economy, 
distributes resources towards labour and has a higher observed GDP 
growth than its opponent, no matter whether right or left-wing. But 
then redistributive transfers should correlate positively with growth in 
cross-country growth regressions. 
Thus, the paper's main insights are the following: In the model op-
timizing governments do not find it optimal to tolerate capital outflows 
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a E (0, 1) and Yt is output produced in the home country. Kt is an indf:!X 
of the domestically productive capital stock, and kt ( k;) is the (broad) 
capital stock, including disembodied technological knowledge, owned by 
domestic (foreign) capitalists and Gt are public inputs to production.9 
Furthermore, Lt = 1, so that labour is supplied inelastically. The foreign 
country has the same technology and technological differences are due 
to A, which is an efficiency index, reflecting cultural, institutional and 
technological development. If both countries are equally efficient (A = 
A*) the economies are called similar, because they may well be different in 
terms of institutional or cultural development. If A =/= A* the economies 
are called different. 
The variable Wt denotes the fraction of real capital at date t owned 
by domestic capitalists allocated to the home country. The rest is located 
abroad. The model allows for the case that all of the domestically owned 
capital is located abroad by assuming Wt E [0, 1]. That serves to bring out 
sharply any effects, capital flight may have for an economy.10 Throughout 
the analysis I abstract from problems arising from depreciation of the 
capital stock. 
The Public Sector. In both countries wealth is taxed and redis-
tributed at constant rates. The governments adopt the source principle 
for wealth taxation. The domestic tax rate T is levied on domestic wealth 
Wtkt and foreign wealth (1- w;)k;. Analogous definitions hold for the 
foreign country. 11 The government faces the following balanced budget 
constraint 
(2) 
9For growth models which interpret knowledge as just another capital good used 
in production see Frankel (1962) or Romer (1986). For an up-to-date discussion of 
these models see, for instance, Aghion and Howitt (1998). 
10Thus, the capital stocks are perfectly mobile across countries in the model which 
is meant to capture very long time horizons. 
11Differential taxation of foreigners and residents in a similar set-up has been an-
alyzed in Rehme (1995). The results there suggest that tax discrimination may lead 
to non-steady state equilibria or similar results as in this paper. 
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programme 
~ax tXJ ln Ct e-ptdt (6) 
ct,wt lo 
s.t. kt = (r- r)wtkt + (r*- r*)(l- Wt)kt- Ct, (7) 
0 :$; Wt :$; 1 , (8) 
k(O) = ko, k(oo) =free. (9) 
Equation (7) is the dynamic budget constraint of the capitalists who earn 
rwtkt income at home and r*(l- Wt)kt income abroad. The necessary 
first order conditions for the problem are given by equations (7), (8), (9) 
and 
U' - f.Lt = 0 (lOa) 
f.Lt(r- r)kt- f.Lt(r* r*)kt = 0 (lOb) 
itt= J.LtP- f.Lt [(r- r)wt + (r*- r*)(l- Wt)] {lOc) 
lim ktf.Lte-pt = 0. (lOd) 
t-too 
where f.Lt is a positive co-state variable representing the instantaneous 
shadow price of one more unit of investment at date t. Equation (lOa) 
equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow price of more 
investment, (lOc) is the standard Euler equation which relates the costs 
of foregone investment (LHS) to the discounted gain in marginal utility 
(RHS) and (lOd) is the transversality condition for the capital stock 
which ensures that the present value of the capital stock approaches zero 
asymptotically. Equation (lOb) describes the capital allocation decision, 
which takes a 'bang-bang' form and is given by 
(r- r) > (r*- r*) 
(r r) = (r* r*) 
(r- r) < (r* - r*) . 
(11) 
The capitalists' allocation decision is extreme in that they immediately 
shift their assets (capital) to the country where the after-tax return on 
capital is higher. Thus, relative to any planning horizon the speed of 
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For the derivation of the two-country market equilibrium and given 
arbitrary tax rates concentrate on the domestic economy first. Divide 
(7) by k,., and use the fact that in steady state 'Yk is constant. Rear-
ranging and taking time derivatives yields 'Y = 'Yk and constant. Also, 
substituting 'Y for 'Yk in (7) establishes that Cf = pkt as· the capitalists' 
instantaneous consumption in steady state. Hence, in the open economy 
the domestic capitalists' consumption grows at the same, constant rate 
as their capital stock. The total wealth of the domestic capitalists at any 
point in time is kt and the budget constraint satisfies equation (7). For 
given w, w* the world resource constraint is given by 
k. k. ( )K ( * *)K* G G* Ck ck· cw C"'" "t + ; = r + TJ t + r + TJ t - t - t - t - t - t - t 
where Kt = wkt + (1- w*)k;, Kt = w*k; + (1- w)kt, Gt = (1- >.)rKt 
and a; = (1 - >.*)r* Kt since the governments run balanced budgets. 
The production functions imply yt = r Kt + ryKt and ~· = r* K; + ry* K;. 
From the private sector optimality and the steady state conditions the 
world resource constraint satisfies 
In equilibrium GDPt = Yt so that GDP must grow at the same rate as 
output. From the production function it follows that output yt must 
grow at same rate as Kt since Gt grows at the same rate as Kt. Then 
the evolution of the domestic economy is determined by the growth rate 
of the aggregate, domestically productive capital stock which is given by 
(14) 
Let a(r) = r- r, b(r*) = r*- r* and M =max (a(r), b(r*)) and notice 
that the max(·) expressions are symmetric. Thus, 
'Y = M - P = 'Y*. 
Hence, the capital income component of GNP grows at equal rates across 
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income abroad and can consume foreign goods. 
2.2 The Government 
The domestic government maximizes the intertemporal utility of its na-
tional clientele. For simplicity, it is assumed to be either entirely pro-
capital ('right-wing') or completely pro-capital ('left-wing').15 The capi-
tal owners' welfare is 
V r ln(pko) 'Y 
= p + p2' V w,w* E [0, 1]. (16) 
so that the model's right-wing government is only concerned about growth 
of the capital owners' wealth. 
The welfare of the workers is given by 
Vw,w* s.t. w :j:. O,w* :j:. 1 (17) 
-00 w = O,w* = 1, 
which is not a proper function, since for given M the w's may be indeter-
minate. Notice that V 1 is increasing in 'Y and so in M. As M implicitly 
determines wand w*, any left-wing policy must try to optimize M. Thus, 
a left-wing government would also try to maximize growth. More impor-
tantly, however, the left-wing government wants to secure a high capital 
stock as that raises wages and provides the basis for redistribution. It will 
want to avoid any situation that leads to capital flight. As the investors' 
capital allocation is extreme, one may say that for a given growth rate 
the left-wing government wants to 'grab' capital. 
The Government in a Closed Economy. Respecting the right of 
private property, the governments choose T and .A ~ 0 in order to max-
15The welfare measures are derived in Appendix A.The paper's qualitative results 
would not change if the government represented the agents' welfare in different pro-
portions. In the model shifting relatively more political power (social weight) to 
capital would always imply higher growth. For a formal argument see Appendix B. 
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countries where full tax harmonization is not feasible. As a consequence 
governments may engage in tax competition. (For a similar point see, for 
instance, Sinn (1990) or Bovenberg (1994).) I model tax competition as a 
two-stage game and assume that the governments move simultaneously, 
but before the private sector. The strategies of the governments are the 
choices of taxes and redistribution. The governments and the private 
sector agents move simultaneously. Furthermore, both economies have 
the same initial capital stock k0 = k0, and are equally efficient, A = A*, 
unless stated otherwise. Solving backwards requires a government to 
maximize (16) or (17) taking its opponent's choice of (r*,.X*) as given. 
Thus, each government's problem is to choose taxes and redistribution 
so that 
r, A= argmax {Vi; given r*, A*} , j = l, r. 
The problem cannot be handled simply by differentiation of the objective 
function since Vi depends on 1 and so M. Recall M = max(r-r, r* -r*) 
which is a continuous function, but not differentiable everywhere. I will 
now analyze each government's problem in turn. 
3.1 Tax competition among similar economies 
Consider the domestic, non-redistributing right-wing government. As the 
welfare measure vr is increasing in 1 and only the growth rate depends 
on taxes the right-wing governments' problem reduces to choosing r such 
that 
r = argmax {M; given r*, A*}. (20) 
Thus, it wants to maximize lvl, given r*, A* and given the optimal, private 
sector w and w*. Recall that a( r) = r - r and b( r*) = r* r*, and notice 
that b is independent of r. Then M = max(a, b) and a is a continuous 
function of r. But for given r* the function b is as well, because a constant 
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welfare measure vr is increasing in 1 and only the growth rate depends 
on taxes the right-wing governments' problem reduces to choosing r such 
that 
r = argmax {M; given r*, A*}. (20) 
Thus, it wants to maximize lvl, given r*, A* and given the optimal, private 
sector w and w*. Recall that a( r) = r - r and b( r*) = r* r*, and notice 
that b is independent of r. Then M = max(a, b) and a is a continuous 
function of r. But for given r* the function b is as well, because a constant 
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A domestic left-wing government's problem is to find T and>. such 
that 
r, >. = argmax {V1; given r*, >.*}. 
Assume>.=>.*= 0 and suppose r* >f. From Figure 2 it is not difficult 
to see that if r* > f the domestic left-wing government sets r = f. If 
f < r* :::; f, it is optimal to set r = r* - c:, where f is small. As r* --+ f 
the domestic left-wing government will definitely set T =f. Thus, 
Lemma 3 In similar economies the best response of a domestic left-wing 
government against any foreign opponent is to choose 
(1) T=f if r* > f 
(2) T = r*- E, if f < r*:::; f 
(3) r=f, if r*--+ f. 
Given the best response functions in similar economies the outcome 
of tax competition is as follows: For two right-wing governments and by 
symmetry of the problem Lemma 2 implies that there is an infinite num-
ber of Nash equilibria. That is due to the fact that if one player chooses 
f the other player is indifferent what to choose. Qualitatively, however, 
that makes sense because in a world with two right-wing governments 
the investors will never pay more or less than f. In the Nash equilibrium 
the after-tax returns are equal so that capital flight may take place. 
Proposition 1 If two right-wing governments engage in tax competition 
in similar economies, there is an infinite number of Nash equilibria. The 
capitalists never pay more or less than f in either country. Capital flight 
is possible and there will be maximum GDP growth in at least one econ-
omy. 
An infinite number of equilibria may appear implausible at first 
sight. However, it has an important economic meaning in the model.18 
one allows for equilibrium refinements a-la Selten (1975), the introduction of 
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The objective of 'grabbing' capital prevents redistribution in equi-
librium and is due to the left-wing government's fear of capital flight. 
Capital 'grabbing' and the right-wing objective of capital income maxi-
mization reduce the number of Nash equilibria to one. Thus, the objec-
tives remove a source of indeterminacy, make capital flight quite unlikely 
and lead to equal GNP and GDP growth for both economies. That is 
so, because in equilibrium with r = r* = f, the after-tax returns will 
be equal and any w, w* combination is possible. Thus, in contrast to 
the closed economy, a non-cooperative environment causes the left-wing 
government to mimic a growth maximizing policy. Importantly, the pos-
sibility of capital flight for the domestic economy is of measure zero. 
Hence, the workers are ex ante better off under left-right than under 
right-right tax competition. Proposition 1 implies that under right-right 
competition capital flight happens in one economy so that the workers 
in that country will 'starve'. As the capital allocation is indeterminate 
in an equilibrium with r = r• = f (Proposition 2), the workers may be 
better off under either a right or a left-wing government. If the capital-
ists happen to shift more capital into the foreign right-wing government's 
economy, its workers will be better off than their domestic counterparts. 
That has the rather surprising implication that the workers may be better 
off under a right-wing government. 
Corollary 1 Under left-right tax competition in technologically similar 
economies {A = A •}, the workers may be better off under a right or a 
left-wing government. 
Economically, the results suggest that in highly integrated, technologi-
cally similar economies political preferences per se are not very important 
in determining growth or the well-being of a government's clientele. 
By Lemma 3 two left-wing governments try to undercut each other. 
But the process of undercutting leads to r = f = r* and no redistribu-
tion. 
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must hold. Furthermore, for redistribution T > [(1- a)A]~. Thus,19 
l~a ( [(1- a)A]~ - [a(1- a)A*]~) T > T [(1- a)A]~ 
(2a a-1) a~ 
For a> j the LHS is smaller than 0.946. Letting A= xA*, x > 1, the 
inequality holds if x > 1.056. Thus, in the model an efficiency advantage 
of, say, 6 percent is enough for a left-wing government to redistribute 
and to have higher GDP growth than its right-wing opponent. 
Proposition 4 A domestic left-wing government with a more efficient 
economy (A> A*) sets taxes so that it gets all the capital (w = 1,w• = 
0), has higher GDP growth than its opponent (f > f* = 0) and may 
redistribute. The capital income component of GNP grows at equal rates 
across countries ('Y = -y*). Furthermore, if it redistributes (.\ > 0), 
the domestic agents are sufficiently impatient (p > [(1 - a)A]i"), the 
domestic economy is relatively efficient (A> (2a':J" aA*), and the share 
of {broad) capital is large (a> j). 
Efficiency differences induce capital flight for an inefficient economy. 
Theoretically, an efficient economy's right-wing policy leads to a higher 
GDP growth rate than a left-wing policy, when competing with inefficient 
economies' governments. The efficient economy's left-wing government 
tries to get all the capital, but does not necessarily choose the growth 
maximizing tax rate. Thus, a hypothetical comparison of regimes when 
A > A* reveals that tax policies, favouring the non-accumulated factor 
of production might be bad for growth. 
However, by Proposition 4 one may observe higher taxes favouring 
the non-accumulated factor of production and higher GDP growth than 
in another, less efficient economy with a right-wing government. Thus, 
in integrated economies it is well possible that an efficient economy's, 
left-wing government distributes towards labour and grows more than 
the fact that P ~ x and x > Q implies Px > Qx. 
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For tax competition among similar economies and no matter what 
distributional preferences a government has, the fear of capital flight 
leads to maximum growth of the capital income component of GNP in 
equilibrium and no redistribution takes place. That holds even though all 
governments might care about redistribution. The reason is that capital 
is good for redistributing governments. Capital flight reduces wages and 
the welfare loss incurred by a drop in wages outweighs the welfare gain 
derived from redistribution. However, political preferences do matter as 
regards GDP. Under right-right tax competition one economy will surely 
experience capital flight and its GDP will not grow. That constellation 
is bad for the workers. If a left-wing government competes against any 
opponent, no capital flight will take place. In that sense, (re-)distributive 
preferences are important for a country's non-accumulated factor of pro-
duction. 
If the countries are technologically different, more capital will locate 
in the efficient economy and it will have higher growth. If the efficient 
country's government wishes to redistribute, it may to do so without 
loosing any capital. The amount of redistribution depends on who the 
opponent is and on the efficiency gap that distinguishes it from its op-
ponents. 
From these arguments it follows that in cross-country growth re-
gressions one would observe a positive association between growth and 
redistribution. 
Furthermore, the paper argues that policies that make an economy 
more efficient are in the interest of both domestic workers and foreign 
as well as domestic capital owners. In comparison to other economies 
redistributive taxation does not necessarily cause slower growth if op-
timizing governments in an integrated world engage in tax competition 
and a redistributing government's economy is technologically superior. 
Several caveats apply. If governments could condition on the history 
of the game, problems of time inconsistency might arise. The paper has 
not analyzed the role of tariffs. It is likely that a country that faces 
the danger of capital outflows will try to set up tariffs. These and other 
problems are left for further research. 
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that 1J = !.=.!:lr. Then AT>.= r,r- 1-crr.x- T and so 
0: 0: 
A+-- T,>. = TT,- T {::} A+-- = __::_--( 1-a) ( 1-a) TT . -T a a r.x r.x 
Let E = (1- a)A[(1- A)r]-cr so that r, = aE(1- A), r.x = aE( -r). 
Then r;:: = 'cr!~;>.> = -(1- A). Thus, for above 
1- a T T,>. 
A+ (1 - A) + -- = -- {::} - = -T 
a r.x a 
which means that E = 1 and 
[(1- a)A]~ 
T= 1-A . (B2) 
For the first order condition forT note that 1J = (1- a)A[(1- A)r]1-cr = 
E[(1-A)r] = [(1-a)A]~. Furthermore,1J, = (1-a)(1-A), r, = a(1-A). 
1 
Then eqn. (B2) entails A = 1 - (( 1 -~A)l> so that 
1 ( [(1- a)A]~) 17 +AT= [(1- a)A]<> + T 1-
7 
= T. 
Then the first order condition for T becomes 
From above '1r+>. = (1-cr)(1->.)+>. = -1 so that T = f3p. Thus 
'Yr cr(1->.)-1 ' 
- [(1- a)A]~ 
f = f3p and A = 1 - f3p . (B3) 
which is equation (18) when f3 = 1. Recall that these equations hold for 
A 2: 0, that is, for f3p 2: [(1- a)A]~. 
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